From your perspective, how does this
demonstrate to us just how wide reaching
his tariff policies are when you think
about these tariffs in particular being
enacted under section 232 on the basis
of national security concerns?
>> Thank you, Tyler, for having me. And
you're right, there is a bigger picture
here. I mean, directly this is going to
contribute to inflation. It's going to
make things more expensive for other
businesses, more expensive for
consumers. And if it doesn't get passed
through fully to inflation, it'll draw
down profits and margins for the
companies. But the bigger picture is one
of governance problems both domestically
and internationally. That the president
has declared emergencies and the
emergencies don't necessarily tie to
what the law says. I mean, there's no
way that steel flatear is a national
security issue. Even if a million
Chinese picked up steel knives, it would
still not be a national security issue
as the law reads. And so Congress has
abdicated what should be a fundamentally
congressional right to set tax policy in
tariffs or taxes. And also because he's
doing it through emergency powers
instead of congressional hearings. It's
all very uncertain. So in the previous
leadup you were talking about your
colleague Bostik was talking about um
Intel. You know, it shouldn't be a
matter of daytoday whether a president
or a secretary of commerce says this is
a good stock to buy like he did about
various companies including Tesla in one
point. It shouldn't be the US government
saying that. But finally,
internationally, it's it's there is no
endgame here because he's basically told
a bunch of countries, not just China,
that in the end he'll set tariffs
whatever they're going to be. if you
retaliate, we're going to escalate and I
can change them at any time. And so at
that point, in a way that wasn't true
under Trump Juan or under Biden, both of
whom did do tariffs, um I think other
countries and investors start throwing
up their hands. Adam, we see the tariffs
and you just brought up Intel too as
part of a larger piece of this Trump
shift when it comes to the global
economy and that's something that you
addressed in a foreign affairs piece out
just this week. Can you talk about what
the consequences are going to be of this
rewriting of the global economic
paradigm led by Donald Trump?
>> Thank you, Michael. I appreciate you're
mentioning that. Um we published it came
out today in foreign affairs a piece
called the new economic geography I
shouldn't say we it's my responsibility
it's my piece um and the basic point is
when we focus very narrowly on tariffs
uh or on bilateral trade balances as the
Trump administration does you don't see
the full picture the full picture is
that the US was basically the insurance
provider to global business to foreign
governments even China but especially
our allies uh terms of shipping defense
in terms of getting money in and out of
dollars um in terms of enforcing laws in
terms of intellectual property and
standards all these things and the US
government collected premium for this uh
we had lower interest rates we had more
than our fair share of inward investment
we had more influence than other
countries in setting standards um and
the Trump people have decided that no we
were getting ripped off this was a bad
deal and we're just going to push hard.
We're going to move from being an
insurer to being an extractor. Um, we're
going to crunch down what coverage we
offer. We're going to massively increase
the premium and we're just going to keep
charging till we can't get any more out.
And people like Secretary Basant or
others in the administration will say
this is just a rebalancing. This is just
if they accept the insurance analogy,
they're just repricing it. My view is,
and we're already starting to see this,
is people are going to choose to
self-insure or go to other insurers, not
rely on the US when they're doing this.
There are some countries like Japan or
Mexico that have no choice. But even
there, the households, the investors
will change. And then other countries
that do have a choice like East Asia,
parts of Europe, they're going to shift.
And we're already seeing that in weaker
dollar. We're already seeing that in
higher interest rates on US treasuries.
We're already seeing that in some of
these um investment decisions that
countries are making. So you get the big
ticket intel announcement that you
rightly reported on. But then you don't
see all the things where China or Europe
gets the opportunities in Indonesia or
Turkey that the US used to.
>> In just our final minute that we have
left with you, I want to zone in on
China because this is of course been a
really big focal point of the
administration as you've been outlining.
So, what is the number one path here
that the White House could take to
remain competitive with China, but also
make sure that there aren't these sort
of consequences that you're outlining?
>> Well, the irony, Tyler, of what they're
doing in my view is China's actually
going to be the least, aren't the least
affected, whereas it's our allies like
Japan, UK, Mexico, Canada that are going
to be worst hit. And so what I've argued
in the past is you want for one of a
better term a suction not sanction
approach with China. Instead of trying
to keep them down, you try and make it
attractive for things to leave China,
ideas, people, investment, and that puts
pressure on the Chinese regime and it
benefits us instead of trying to bottle
them up and making them mad at